last they make use of sophistical arguments, as if the conclusion did not follow from the things laid down, but they allow readily, trusting to habit, and apprehending that they will suffer no inconvenience. Moreover, we must extend the discourse and insert things which are of no use to it, as they do, who write falsely, for when there are many things, it is dubious in which consists the falsity, wherefore sometimes also, interrogators escape notice, proposing secretly, things which proposed by themselves, would not be admitted.
For concealment then, we must use the thing stated, but for ornament, we must employ induction and division of things homogeneous. What kind of thing then induction is, is clear, but division is one of such a kind, as that one science is better than another, either from its being more accurate, or from its belonging to better subjects; and that of sciences, some are theoretical, others practical, but others effective, for each thing of this kind adorns a speech, yet it is not necessary that it should be adduced, in order to the conclusion.
For the sake of perspicuity, we must adduce examples and comparisons; examples indeed appropriate, and from which we derive information, such as Homer, not as Chœrilus (employs), for thus, what is proposed will be more perspicuous.
Chapter 2
In disputation we must employ syllogism with dialecticians, rather than with the multitude, but induction, on the contrary, rather with the multitude, concerning which also we have spoken before. Still, in some cases, he who makes an induction may question the universal, but in others this is not easy, from a common name not being laid down in all similitudes, but when it is necessary to assume the universal, they say it is
