Chapter 6
Nevertheless we must not forget that every thing which is referred to property, genus, and accident will also be adapted to definitions, for by showing that a thing is not present with that alone which is under definition, as in the case of property, or that what is given in the definition is not genus, or that some one of those things stated in the definition is not present, which may also be said in accident, we shall have subverted the definition; so that, on account of the reason given before, all those things which have been enumerated will after a certain manner be definitive. Nevertheless we must not on this account look for one method universal in all things, as neither is it easy to discover this, and if it were discovered it would be altogether obscure and useless to the proposed treatise. But a peculiar method being delivered as to each of the defined genera singly, the discussion of the proposition will be easy from those things which are appropriate to each. Wherefore, as we have before said, we must make a rough division, but of the rest we must join those which are especially appropriate to each, denominating them both definitive and generic. What, however, have been set forth have almost been adapted to each.
Chapter 7
We must first of all distinguish about "the same," in how many ways it is predicated; but "the
