the true through false, and very silly assertions, it will be worse than many, which collect the false, and such will be the reasoning, collecting the false. Wherefore, it is evident that the first consideration of the argument per se will be whether it concludes; next, whether (it concludes) the true or false; thirdly, from what assertions, for if from those which are false but probable, it is a logical argument, but if from what are (true) yet improbable, it is faulty. If, also, they are false, and very improbable, the argument is evidently bad, either simply, or with respect to the thing (discussed).
Chapter 13
As to what was (investigated) in the beginning and contraries, how the questionist demands a postulate according to truth, indeed, has been told in the Analytics, but must now be discussed according to opinion.
Now, men appear to beg what was in the beginning in five ways, most evidently, indeed, and primarily, if any one begs the very thing which ought to he demonstrated; this, however, does not easily escape notice, as to the thing itself, but rather in synonyms, and wherein the name and the definition signify the same thing. Secondly, when what ought to be demonstrated particularly, any one asks for, universally, as when endeavouring to show there is one science of contraries, he demands it to be altogether granted, that there is one of opposites, for he seems to beg together with many things, that which he ought to demonstrate per se. Thirdly, if any one proposing to demonstrate the universal, begs the particular; as if when it is proposed (to be shown), that there is one science of all contraries, some one should require it to be granted, that (there is one) of certain contraries; for he also seems to beg per se separately, that which he ought to show, together with many
