Chapter 7
Deception of these (paralogisms) from equivocation and (ambiguous) sentence, arises from our not being able to distinguish that which is multifariously predicated, (since it is not easy to divide some things, for instance, the one, being, and the same;) but of those from composition and division, in consequence of fancying there is no difference between a conjoined, and a divided sentence, as is the case in most things. Similarly also with regard to those from accent, for either in nothing, or not in many things, a sentence with intention, and a sentence with remission, appear to signify the same thing. But of those from figure of speech, it is on account of the similarity of diction, for it is difficult to distinguish what things are predicated after the same, and what in a different manner, (since he who is able to do this, almost approaches the perception of truth, and especially knows how to assent,) because we suppose that every thing predicated of a certain thing, is this definite thing, and we admit it as one; for this particular definite thing, and being, seem especially to be consequent to the one, and to essence. Wherefore this mode is to be placed amongst those (fallacies) which belong to diction; first, because deception rather arises to those who consider with others, than by themselves, (for consideration with others, is through discourse, but that by oneself, is no less through the thing itself;) next, it happens that one is deceived by oneself, when one makes the consideration by words; moreover, deception is from resemblance, but resemblance from diction. Of the paralogisms from accident, (there is deception) from our inability to distinguish the same, and
