wished the contrary, or by making the interrogation equally; for it not being evident what (the interrogator) wishes to assume, (the respondents) are less indignant. When, too, any one admits the several particulars partially, by making an induction of the universal, frequently an interrogation must not be made, but we must use it as granted, for sometimes they (the respondents) think they have admitted, and appear to the auditors from making mention of induction, as if the particulars had not been questioned in vain; and in those wherein the universal is not signified by name, we must yet use similitude, as may be expedient, for similitude frequently escapes notice. In order also to assume a proposition, we ought to make the inquiry by a comparison of the contrary; as if it should be necessary to assume, that it is right in all things to obey a father, (we must ask) whether it is necessary to obey parents in all things, or to disobey them in all? and, (if it is answered that we ought) frequently (to obey them, we must ask) whether many things are to be conceded to them, or a few? for if it is necessary (to obey them), many things will seem to be conceded, for when contraries are placed by each other, they appear to men to be greater, and great, and worse, and better.
The sophistical false accusation indeed of those who question, when not syllogistically concluding any thing, they do not question the extreme, but conclusively say, as if a syllogism had been made, "it is not so and so;" this very much and frequently causes a person to appear confuted by an elenchus.
It is also sophistical, when a paradox is laid down, to demand that what is apparent should be answered, that being proposed which seemed true from the beginning, and to question things thus, "Whether does it seem so to you?" for it is necessary if the question be of those things from which a syllogism is formed, that there should be either an elenchus or a paradox; if he grants, an elenchus, but if he neither concedes nor says that it seems to him to be true, something contrary to opinion, and if he does not concede, but acknowledges it seems true to him, a form of elenchus.
