(the solution) if some one does not assume the same axiom from "to know," but from "to be," or "to subsist after a certain manner;" as if this (dog) is a father, and is yours, (therefore it is your father,) for though this is true in certain instances, and it is possible to know, and to be ignorant of, the same thing, yet here what is said, is by no means appropriate. Still there is nothing to prevent the same argument having many faults, yet not the exposition of every fault is a solution, for it is possible that some one may show that to be false, which is syllogistically concluded, but may not show whence it is false; as that argument of Zeno, that nothing can be moved. Wherefore, if some (respondent) should endeavour to lead to the impossible, he errs, though it should be concluded ten thousand times, since this is not a solution, for the solution was the display of a false syllogism, (showing) whence it is false, if then (the opponent) concludes nothing, whether he endeavours to collect the true or the false, the manifestation of that thing is a solution. Perhaps indeed, nothing prevents this occurring in certain cases, except that in these, this cannot appear, for he knows that Coriscus is Coriscus, and that he who approaches is he who approaches. It seems indeed to be possible to know, and not to know the same thing, for instance, to know that a thing is white, but not to know that it is musical, for thus a man knows and does not know the same thing, yet not according to the same, but here he knows what approaches, and Coriscus, and Coriscus (to be) that which approaches, and (to be) Coriscus.
Likewise, also they err, who solve (by stating) that every number is few, as those whom we mentioned, for if nothing being concluded, leaving out this, they say that they have concluded the true, for that every number is both much and few, they err.
Some also solve these syllogisms by duplicity, as that it is your father, or son, or servant; yet
