Chapter 25
Those which are from this particular thing, being predicated properly, or in a certain respect, or some where, or after a manner, or with a relation to something, and not simply, we must solve by considering the conclusion with reference to contradiction, whether it is possible for any thing of this sort to occur in them. For contraries, and opposites, and affirmation, and negation, simply indeed, cannot possibly be inherent in the same thing, though nothing prevents each of these being inherent in a certain respect, or with relation to something, or after a manner, or one being inherent in a certain respect, but another simply. Wherefore, if one is (predicated) simply, but another in a certain respect, there is not yet an elenchus; but this we must investigate in the conclusion, in reference to contradiction.
Nevertheless, all such arguments are as follow: is it possible, for what is not, to be? But what is not, is something. In like manner being, will not be, for it will not be any one of beings. Is it, then, possible that the same person can at one and the same time take an oath properly, and commit a perjury? Is it possible that the same man, at one and the same time, can believe and not believe, the same person? Or are to be a certain thing, and to be
