which the definitions are different, are themselves also different, but it is (the definition) of species to be under genus, and to be predicated of many things, also differing in number, in respect to what a thing is, and things of this kind, but of property it is to be present to a thing alone, and to every individual and always.[1]
Chap. XVI.—Of Community and Difference of Species and Accident.
1. Reason why points of community, between species and accident are rare. Their several peculiarities. Cf. Whately, Mansel. Huyshe, and Wallis (Logics).To species and accident it is common to be predicated of many, but other points of community are rare, from the circumstance of accident, and that to which it is accidental, differing very much from each other. Now, the properties of each are these: of species, to be predicated of those of which it is the species, in respect to what a thing is, but of accident, in reference to what kind a thing is of, or how it subsists.[2] Likewise, that each substance partakes of one species, but of many accidents, both separable and inseparable: moreover, species are conceived prior to accidents, even if they be inseparable, (for there mast be subject, in order that something should happen to it,) but accidents are naturally adapted to be of posterior origin, and possess a nature adjunctive to substance. Again, of species the participation is equal, but of accident, even if it be inseparable, it is not equal; for an Ethiopian may have a colour intense, or remitted, according to blackness, with reference to an(other) Ethiopian.[3]
Chap. XVII.—Of Community and Difference of Property and Accident.[4]
1. Property and inseparable accident cannotIt remains to speak of property and accident, for how property differs from species, difference, and
- ↑ The points mentioned here, will be elucidated by a reference to notes at chapters 2, 4, and to the Logics of Whately, Mansel, Huyshe, and Wallis.
- ↑ Buhle retains the distinction here, between quid and quale quid, upon which, see notes on ch. 2 and 3. The reading is that of Julius Pacius, whom all later editors have followed: the Latin interpretation renders it, "accidentis vero in eo, quod quale quiddam, vel quomodo se habens."
- ↑ Cf. Metap. lib. v. (vi.) and vi. (vii.), Leipsic ed.
- ↑ Accidents may be distinguished from properties by the very defini-