tifariously since the contrary also is. Likewise to the beautiful in an animal, the ugly, but in a family, the depraved (is contrary), so that the beautiful is equivocal.
In some, indeed, there is no dissonance in the names, but the difference in them is at once palpable in species, as in white and black, for voice is said to be clear and obscure in the same manner as colour. In these, then, there is no dissonance in names, but their difference is at once evident in species, for colour and voice are not similarly called clear, and this is also evident from sense, for of things which are the same in species, the sense is the same; but we do not judge the lightness which is in voice, and that which is in colour, by the same sense, but one by sight, and the other, by hearing. So also the sharp and the obtuse in fluids and magnitudes, the one indeed by touch, the other by taste, since neither are these dissonant in names, neither in themselves nor in the contraries, for what is obtuse is contrary to each.
Again, we must consider if there is any thing contrary to the one, but nothing simply to the other; as, to the pleasure from drinking, the pain from thirst is contrary; but to that which arises from contemplating, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with its side, there is nothing (contrary), wherefore pleasure is predicated multifariously. To hate, also, is contrary to the love which is mental, but nothing to that which subsists according to bodily energy, wherefore it is evident that to love, is equivocal. Besides, we must consider the media, if there is a certain medium of some, but not of others, or whether there is of both, yet not the same, as of white and black, in colour, the dark brown; but in voice, there is no medium, unless it be the hoarse, as
