of many, whether opinion also is, and if to possess sight is to see, whether to possess hearing also is to hear, and likewise of the rest, both in the case of the real and of the apparent. This place indeed is useful for both, for if it is so with any similar, it will be also with other similars, but if not with some, neither with the others. Still we must consider both, whether the same occurs in one thing and in many, for sometimes there is a discrepancy; thus, if to know scientifically is to energize with the intellect, to know many things scientifically is intellectually to energize about many things, but this is not true, for we may know much scientifically without energizing the intellect, if then this is not (true), neither is that (which was asserted) in one thing, viz. that to know scientifically is to energize the intellect.
Besides, we must take arguments from the more and less; now there are four places of the more, one is, if the more follows the more, as if pleasure is good, the greater pleasure is the greater good, and if to injure is evil, the greater injustice is the greater evil. This place indeed is useful for both, for if the addition of the accident is consequent upon the addition of the subject, as was stated, it is evident that it happens, but if it is not consequent it does not happen, but this must be assumed by induction. Another place is, when one thing is predicated of two, if it is not present with what it is more probable to be present, neither (will it be) with what (it is) less (probable), and if it is present with what it is less probable to be present, (it is) also with what (it is) more (probable). Again, when two things are predicated of one, if what appears more present is not present, neither will the less, or if that which appears to be less present is present, that which is more (will be). Once more, when two things are predicated of two, if what appears more present with the one is not present, neither will the remainder be
