which is according to the better science, but to a certain one, that which is according to his proper science.
Next, whatever is in genus (is more eligible) than that which is not in genus, for instance, justice than a just man, for the one is in genus, that is, in good, but the other, not, and the one is what is good, but the other not, since nothing is said to be what genus is, which does not happen to be in genus, thus a white man, is not what colour is, and similarly of the rest.
That, also, which is eligible for itself, is preferable, to what is eligible for the sake of something else, as to be well, is preferable to being exercised, for the one is eligible for itself, but the other for something else. Also what is per se, than what is accidental, as that friends, rather than that enemies, should be just, for the one is eligible per se, but the latter accidentally, since we wish our enemies to be just, from accident, that they may not injure us. This, however, is the same with what is prior to it, but it differs in the mode, as we desire our friends, to be just, for their own sake, even if nothing should happen to us, and they should be in India, but our enemies, for something else, viz. that they may do us no injury.
The cause also, per se, of good, is preferable to the accidental cause, as virtue than fortune, for the one, is the cause of good, per se, but the other accidentally; also, if there is any thing else of the kind. It will be the same, too, in the contrary (to the eligible), for what is per se, the cause of evil, is more to be avoided, than the accidental cause, for instance, vice and fortune, for the one is evil per se, but fortune from accident.
The simple good, again, is more eligible than that which is (so) to a certain person, as to be well than to be cut, for the one is simply good, but the other to some one who requires to be cut. Also what is naturally (good, is preferable) to what is not naturally (so), as justice than a just man, since the one is by nature, but the other is acquired.
