objection, since there is nothing to prevent the one being in a small degree similar to the better, but the other being very similar to the worse. As if Ajax was a little like Achilles, but Ulysses excessively like Nestor. Also if what resembles the better is like so far as pertains to the worse, but what resembles the worse so far as belongs to the better, as a horse with respect to an ass, and an ape to a man.
Another, the more illustrious, (is preferable) to that which is less so, likewise the more difficult, for the possession of those things is dearer to us which cannot easily be obtained. Again, the more peculiar than the more common. Also that which has less connexion with evils, for that is preferable which no molestation follows, rather than that which it does follow.
Again, if this is simply better than that, that which is the best in this, is better than that which is the best in the other, as, if man is better than horse, the best man also is better than the best horse, and if the best is better than the best, this also is simply better than that, thus, if the best man is better than the best horse, man also simply is better than horse.
Further, those things of which our friends can share are preferable to what they cannot partake of: also those which we would rather do for a friend, are preferable to what we would do for any one, as, to act justly and to do good are preferable to seeming (to do so), for we rather desire to benefit our friends than to seem (to benefit them), but contrarily with regard to casual persons.
