likewise whether all those things which are above the genus. For if there is any discrepancy, what is assigned is evidently not genus, as if it were genus, all things above this, and the very thing itself, would be predicated in reference to what a thing is, of which things species also is predicated, in respect of the same. Now this is useful to the subverter, if the genus is not predicated in respect to what a thing is, of which thing, species also is predicated, but to the confirmer it is useful, if it is predicated in the question, what a thing is. For both the genus and the species, will happen to be predicated of the same, in respect to what a thing is, so that the same thing is under two genera, wherefore the genera are necessarily subaltern. If then what we wish to constitute genus is shown not to be under species, species will be evidently under it, so that it will have been proved that this is genus.
Examine moreover, the definitions of the genera, whether they suit the assigned species, and the participants of the species, since it is necessary that the definitions of the genera, should be predicated of the species, and of what partakes of the species, so that if there is any where a discrepancy, it is manifest that genus is not, what has been assigned.
Again, whether a person has given the difference, as a genus, must be (looked to); for instance, whether the immortal, as a genus of God, for immortal, is the difference of animal, since of animals, some are mortal, but some immortal, so that there is evidently an error, for the difference, is not the genus, of any thing. But that this is true is evident, for no difference signifies what
