else;) others, again, cannot simply be inherent in those to which they happen to be referred, (as the contrary can neither be in the contrary, nor science in its object, unless the object of science should be the soul or man;) we must observe, whether any one places a thing of this kind in a genus, which is not of this kind, as if he declared that memory is the permanency of science. For all permanency is in, and about, that which is permanent, so that the permanency of science is in science; memory therefore is in science, since it is the permanency of science, yet this is impossible, for all memory is in the soul. The place here spoken of, is common also to accident, for it does not signify whether we say that permanency is the genus of memory, or call it accidental to it; since if in any way whatever, memory is the permanency of science, the same reasoning will suit it.
Chapter 5
Again, if a person has referred habit to energy, or the energy to the habit, as that sense is a motion through the body, for sense is a habit, but motion an energy. Likewise, if he has stated memory to be a habit retentive of opinion, since no memory is a habit, but rather an energy.
They also err, who arrange habit under consequent power, as that mildness is a command of anger, and that courage and justice are the control of fear and lucre, for the impassive man is said to be courageous and mild, but he is self-controlled, who, when he suffers, is not carried away. Perhaps, therefore, such
