truly predicated of species. In a similar manner neither is wine putrified water, as Empedocles calls it
- "—the water putrified in wood."
for simply it (wine) is not water.
Chapter 6
Further, (we must notice) whether, in short, what is proposed is the genus of nothing, for (if so) it will evidently not be that of the thing enunciated; but this must be considered from those which are participant of the assigned genus, not at all differing in species, as, for instance, white things, for such do not at all differ in species from each other; yet of every genus the species are different, so that whiteness will not be the genus of any thing.
Again, whether that which is consequent to all, has been declared genus or difference, for many things are consequent to all, as "being," and "the one," are of the number of things consequent to all. If then a person has assigned being as genus, it will evidently be the genus of all things, since it is predicated of them, for genus is predicated of nothing else than of species, so that "the one" will be a species of "being." Of all then of which genus is predicated, it happens that species is also predicated, since "being," and "the one," are simply predicated of all, when it is necessary that species should be predicated to a less extent. If however he has stated that what is consequent to all, is difference, it is manifest that difference will be predicated to an equal or greater extent than genus, for if genus is of the number of things consequent to all, it will be predicated to an equal extent, but if genus does not follow all, difference will be predicated to a greater extent than it.
