thing assigned. This place however is useful, especially in such things wherein those appear many, which are predicated of species, in reference to the question what a thing is, and when there has not been definition, neither can we say what is their genus; as of anger, both pain, and the opinion of contempt, seem to be predicated, in reference to what a thing is, since the angry man is pained, and thinks that he is contemned. Indeed there is the same consideration in species, to any one comparing it with something else, as if the more, or what appears similarly to be in the assigned genus, is not in the genus, the assigned species, it is evident, cannot be in the genus.
The subverter then must employ this as we have said, but to the supporter this place is not useful, if the assigned genus and species accept the more, for there is nothing to prevent, when both accept it, one from becoming the genus of the other; for both the beautiful and the white accept the more, and neither is the genus of the other. Yet the comparison of the genera and of the species with each other is useful, as if this, and that, are similarly genus, if one of them is genus, the other also is. Likewise, if the less, the more also is, as if power more than virtue is the genus of continence, but virtue is a genus, so likewise power. The same things will be adapted to be said also of species, for if this, and that, are similarly species of the proposed (genus), if one be species, the other also is, and if the less seeming is species, the more is likewise.
Moreover, in order to confirm, we must examine whether the genus in those things in which it is assigned, is predicated in reference to what a thing is, when the assigned species is not one, but there are many and different (species), for it will be evidently genus. But if the assigned species be one, see whether the genus is predicated also of other species in reference to what a thing is; since, again, it will occur that the same thing is predicated of those which are many and different.
