Page:Observations on Man 1834.djvu/217

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They had also an advantage as representatives in general, before the invention of alphabetical writing, since persons could by this means convey their thoughts to each other at a distance.

If we suppose characters to be improved to all that variety and multiplicity which is necessary for representing objects, ideas, and clusters of characters, in the same manner as words represent objects, ideas, and clusters of words, still they might be resolved into simple component parts, and rendered pronunciable by affixing some simple or short sound to each of these simple component parts; just as articulate sounds are painted by being first resolved into their simple component parts, and then having each of these represented by a simple mark or character.

If we suppose the most common visible objects to be denoted both by short articulate sounds, and by short characters bearing some real, or fancied, imperfect resemblance to them, it is evident, that the sound and mark, by being both associated with the visible object, would also be associated with one another; and consequently that the sound would be the name of the mark, and the mark the picture of the sound. And this last circumstance seems to lead to the denoting all sounds by marks, and therefore perhaps to alphabetical writing.

At the same time it must be observed, that the marks would bear different relations of similarity and dissimilarity to one another from those which the corresponding sounds did.

This would happen, according to whatever law the marks were made, but especially if they were resemblances of visible objects. And this, as it seems, would occasion some difficulty and perplexity in representing sounds by marks, or marks by sounds.


Prop. LXXXII.—To explain the Nature of figurative Words and Phrases, and of Analogy, from the foregoing Theory.


A figure is a word, which, first representing the object or idea A, is afterwards made to represent B, on account of the relation which these bear to each other.

The principal relation, which gives rise to figures, is that of likeness; and this may be either a likeness in shape, and visible appearance, or one in application, use, &c. Now it is very evident from the nature of association, that objects which are like to a given one in visible appearance, will draw to themselves the word by which this is expressed. And indeed this is the foundation upon which appellatives are made to stand for so great a number of particulars. Let the word man be applied to the particular persons A, B, C, &c. till it be sufficiently associated with them, and it will follow, that the appearance of the new particular person D will suggest the word, and be denoted by it. But here there is no figure, because the word man is associated