Page:Observations on Man 1834.djvu/244

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ideas in general affixed to the words of his native language, as other men have. A pretended sceptic is therefore no more than a person who varies from the common usage in his application of a certain set of words, viz. truth, certainty, assent, dissent, &c.

Cor. V. As there is a foundation for unity amongst mankind in the use and application of words, so there is for an unity in the assent, or complex ideas belonging to propositions; and a philosophical language, or any other method of bringing about the first unity, would much conduce to this. A careful examination of things, of the world natural, the human mind, the Scriptures, would conduce much also. But candour, simplicity, and an humble sense of our own ignorance, which may be called a religious or christian scepticism, is the principal requisite, and that without which this part of the confusion at Babel can never be remedied. When religion has equally and fully absorbed different persons, so that God is, in respect of them, all in all, as far as the present condition of mortality will permit, their practical assent must be the same; and therefore their rational cannot differ long or widely.

The ideas and internal feelings which arise in the mind, from words and propositions, may be compared to, and illustrated by, those which the appearances of different persons excite. Suppose two persons, A and B, to go together into a crowd, and there each of them to see a variety of persons whom he knew in different degrees, as well as many utter strangers. A would not have the same ideas and associations raised in him from viewing the several faces, dresses, &c. of the persons in the crowd, as B, partly from his having a different knowledge of, and acquaintance with them, partly from different predispositions to approve and disapprove. But let A and B become equally acquainted with them, and acquire, by education and association, the same predispositions of mind, and then they will at last make the same judgment of each of the persons whom they see.

Cor. VI. Religious controversies concerning abstract propositions arise generally from the different degrees of respect paid to terms and phrases, which conduce little or nothing to the generation of practical faith, or of love to God, and trust in Him through Christ.


Prop. LXXXVII.—To deduce Rules for the Ascertainment of Truth, and Advancement of Knowledge, from the Mathematical Methods of considering Quantity.


This is done in the doctrine of chances, with respect to the events there considered. And though we seldom have such precise data, in mixed sciences, as are there assumed, yet there are two remarks, of very general use and application, deducible from the doctrine of chances.

Thus, first, If the evidences brought for any proposition,