sitions to miniature vibrations, analogous to those which take place in the persons here considered; and which are in them the result of foregoing impressions, if we admit the theory of these papers. Now, to me, there seems no difficulty in ascribing this to the mere bodily make in brutes, so that miniature vibrations, such as answer in us to ideas, and voluntary motions, shall spring up in them at certain ages and seasons of the year, and mix themselves with impressions, and acquired ideas, so as to be, in general, suitable to them; and, in general, to direct the brute creatures in what manner to provide for, and preserve, themselves and their young.
This would be a kind of inspiration to brutes, mixing itself with, and helping out, that part of their faculties which corresponds to reason in us, and which is extremely imperfect in them. Only this inspiration might be called natural, as proceeding from the same stated laws of matter and motion as the other phænomena of nature; whereas the inspiration of the sacred writers appears to be of a much higher source, so as to be termed supernatural properly, in contradistinction to all knowledge resulting from the common laws of nature. And yet it may result from some higher laws of nature. For sacred inspiration would lose nothing of its authority, though it should appear to be within such laws, as by their fixedness might be termed nature: and, indeed, all differences in these things, after the facts are once settled, will be found, upon due inquiry, to be merely verbal.
Fifthly, The last cause here assigned for the great difference and inferiority of brutes, in respect of intellectual capacities, is the difference in the events and incidents of their lives. They converse with far fewer objects than men, and both the objects and pleasures of feeling, taste, and smell, have a far greater proportional share in the sum total, than in us. Now, as in men, the common events and incidents of life give a turn to the whole frame of mind, and either enlarge the intellectual capacities, if they be various, or narrow them, if the same occurrences return again and again perpetually; so, independently of all the foregoing considerations, the sameness, paucity, and relation to mere sense, of the impressions made on brutes, must infer a great narrowness of understanding.
From all these things put together, it appears very conceivable how the mental faculties of brutes should, consistently with the doctrines of vibrations and association, be what they are, in fact, found to be. And though I suppose, with Descartes, that all their motions are conducted by mere mechanism, yet I do not suppose them to be destitute of perception, but that they have this in a manner analogous to that which takes place in us; and that it is subjected to the same mechanical laws as the motions. Whether the ideal vibrations, which take place in the medullary substances of their brains, be the result of former impressions, or
