as was said above, that every thing must be ultimately good, both naturally and morally.
The second species of self-interest is that which I call refined self-interest. As the foregoing species is generated by an attention to, and frequent reflection upon, the things which procure us the pleasures of sensation, imagination, and ambition; and, therefore, cannot prevail, in any great degree, till these pleasures have been generated, and prevailed for some time; so this species, or refined self-interest, which is a cool, deliberate seeking for ourselves the pleasures of sympathy, religion, and the moral sense, pre-supposes the generation of these pleasures, and the enjoyment of them for a sufficient time. And as some degree of gross self-interest is the natural and necessary consequence of the three first classes of pleasures, so is some degree of refined self-interest of the three last. A person who has had a sufficient experience of the pleasures of friendship, generosity, devotion, and self-approbation, cannot but desire to have a return of them, when he is not under the particular influence of any one of them, but merely on account of the pleasure which they have afforded; and will seek to excite these pleasures by the usual means, to treasure up to himself such means, keep himself always in a disposition to use them, &c. not at all from any particular vivid love of his neighbour, or of God, or from a sense of duty to him, but entirely from the view of private happiness. At least, there will be a great mixture of this refined self-interest in all the pleasures and duties of benevolence, piety, and the moral sense.
But then this refined self-interest is neither so common, nor so conspicuous in real life, as the gross one, since it rises late, is never of any great magnitude in the bulk of mankind, through their want of the previous pleasures of sympathy, religion, and the moral sense, in a sufficient degree, and in some it scarce prevails at all; whereas gross self-interest rises early in infancy, and arrives at a considerable magnitude before adult age. The detail of this second species of self-interest may be seen in books of practical religion.
The third species of self-interest is the rational. This is the same thing with the abstract desire of happiness, and aversion to misery, which is supposed to attend every intelligent being during the whole course of his existence. I have already endeavoured to shew, that this supposition is not true in the proper sense of the words; and yet that very general desires do frequently recur to the mind, and may be excited by words and symbols of general import.
