are called eternal, from their appearing the same, or nearly the same, to the mind at all times, would determine the mind to form the corresponding moral judgment independently of prior associations, this ought also to be proved by the allegation of proper instances. To me it appears, that the instances are, as far as we can judge of them, of an opposite nature, and favour the deduction of all our moral judgments, approbations, and disapprobations, from association alone. However, some associations are formed so early, repeated so often, rivetted so strong, and have so close a connexion with the common nature of man, and the events of life which happen to all, as, in a popular way of speaking, to claim the appellation of original and natural dispositions; and to appear like instincts when compared with dispositions evidently factitious; also like axioms, and intuitive propositions, eternally true according to the usual phrase, when compared with moral reasonings of a compound kind. But I have endeavoured to shew in these papers, that all reasoning, as well as affection, is the mere result of association.
CONCLUSION:
CONTAINING SOME REMARKS ON THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND.
Besides the consequences flowing from the doctrine of association, which are delivered in the corollaries to the fourteenth proposition, there is another, which is thought by many to have a pernicious tendency in respect of morality and religion; and which therefore it will be proper that I should consider particularly.
The consequence I mean is that of the mechanism or necessity of human actions, in opposition to what is generally termed free-will. Here then I will,
First, State my notion of the mechanism or necessity of human actions.
Secondly, Give such reasons as induce me to embrace the opinion of the mechanism of human actions.
Thirdly, Consider the objections and difficulties attending this opinion.
And, lastly, Allege some presumptions in favour of it from its consequences.
By the mechanism of human actions I mean, that each action results from the previous circumstances of body and mind, in the same manner, and with the same certainty, as other effects do
