cal reason; the faculty of choice (Germanicè, Willkiihr,) and (distinct both from the moral will, and the choice) the sensation of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of single and double touch. Thence I propose to make a new arrangement of madness, whether as defect, or as excess of any of these senses or faculties; and thus by appropriate cases to shew the difference between, I. a man, having lost his reason, but not his senses or understanding—that is, he sees things as other men see them; he adapts means to ends, as other men would adapt them, and not seldom, with more sagacity; but his final
it does not deserve! By knowledge a priori, we do not mean that we can know any thing previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of experience, (i.e. something acting upon us from without) we then know, that it must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only I know, that I have eyes; but then my reason convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience.
