Introduction
dicted some time before the respective movements had emerged from the stage of organization and consolidation–Phase I.
At the present time, much attention is being devoted to the development of "gadgetry." A good example of this restricted approach to the problem was reported in Newsweek:*
PENTAGON—A new and fiendishly ingenious anti-guerrilla weapon is being tested by the Navy. It's a delayed-action liquid explosive, squirted From a flame-thrower-like gun, that seeps into foxholes and bunkers. Seconds later, fed by oxygen from the air, it blows up with terrific force.
Apparently we are to assume that guerrillas will conveniently ensconce themselves in readily identifiable "foxholes and bunkers" awaiting the arrival of half a dozen admirals armed with "flame-thrower-like guns" to march up, squirt, and retire to the nearest officers' club. To anyone even remotely acquainted with the philosophy and doctrine of revolutionary guerrilla war, this sort of thing is not hilariously funny. There are no mechanical panaceas.
I do not mean to suggest that proper weapons and equipment will not play an important part in antiguerrilla operations, for of course they will. Constant efforts should be made to improve communication, food, medical, and surgical "packs." Weapons and ammunition must be drastically reduced in weight; there seems to be no technical reason why a sturdy, light, accurate automatic rifle weigh-
