Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare
of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy's rear but also frequently prevented his advance. On one occasion, the guerrillas completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously been defeated by regular Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front. "Thus not only was the enemy's manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the ever-moving guerrilla" (The Nature of Guerrilla Action).
The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where there were detached groups of several thousands in strength, old, middle aged, and young. The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known as "silver-haired units"; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups for the children. Among the leaders were determined Communists who carried on general political work among the people. These, although they opposed the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who condemned it. Experience tells us that "Orthodox armies are the fundamental and principal power; guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the regular forces" (Lessons of the Civil War in Russia).* Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia gradually developed until in battle they were able to dis-
* See p. 48 n.-S.B.G.
