to Moses a place with Solon and Lycurgus among the lawgivers of antiquity, yet sometimes qualify their praise by implying that Moses was great, and that his Law was great, by comparison with ancient barbarism rather than with modern civilization. It may therefore serve a useful purpose to devote a few pages to considering the character of his legislation, that we may judge whether it lies in the line of barbarism or of civilization. Is the Hebrew Law composed merely of the arbitrary decrees of one who ruled, like any Oriental monarch, with absolute authority, and whose decrees merely registered the impulses of his capricious will? or is it founded in principles of justice, which fit it, not for one age alone, but for all ages; not for the Hebrews only, but for mankind?
There is a very common reflection upon the Hebrew Lawgiver, which, though it does not call in question any particular law, is yet designed to vitiate and weaken the impression of the whole — that he was a stern and relentless ruler, who may indeed have understood the principles of justice, but whose justice was seldom tempered with mercy. This impression is derived partly at least from the summary way in which in several instances he dealt with rebellion. To this kind of argument there is one brief and sufficient answer: all bodies of men are acknowledged to have the right to resort to severe penalties when encompassed by extraordinary dangers. The children of Israel were in a position of great peril, and their safety depended on the wisdom and firmness of one man. Never had a ruler a more difficult task. Moses did not legislate for the ideal republic of Plato, a community of perfect beings, but for a people born in slavery, from which they had but just broken away, and that were in danger of becoming ungovernable. Here were two millions and a half, who had not even a settled place of abode. Had they been dwelling in towns and
