vein at the story of the coming of Havelock to the relief of the beleaguered garrison of Lucknow, now returned when I read of the Highlanders marching up the heights and taking possession of the Citadel of Cairo.
The war is over, but what shall come after it? That is the question which now troubles Europe and the East. As England has had to fight the battle alone, she is entitled to consider, first of all, her own security and protection. She can no longer leave the control of the Suez Canal, and with it her communications with India, to the mercy of any military usurper, who by getting control of the army, may be master of Egypt — only for a few weeks, it may be, yet long enough to work irremediable injury to the commerce of the world. How is this security to be obtained? Years ago Bismarck advised England to take Egypt and keep it. Mr. Gladstone disavows any such purpose, and no doubt with the utmost sincerity. But what may not be a matter of design, may be a matter of necessity. If it were so, it would be the best possible thing for that country. But the same end may be accomplished by England assuming a protectorate over Egypt, while leaving the Khedive as its nominal ruler.
As for Turkey, she has done nothing, and should get nothing. Indeed her part has been worse than nothing. Her whole course from the beginning has been one of falsehood and treachery. The Sultan encouraged the revolt of Arabi Pacha, and sent him a decoration at the very time that he was in arms against the Khedive, only to denounce him as a rebel as soon as (and not a moment before) it became evident that his cause was lost! The proper return for this duplicity would be that the Sultan should lose his hold in Africa. If, as the outcome of this war, the connection of Egypt with Turkey could be severed forever, the end would be worth all that it has cost.
