As a secondary point, it is worthwhile to distinguish
uncritical or reflexive open-mindedness from thoughtful
or reflective open-mindedness. Whereas reflexive openmindedness results from an intuitive mindset that is very
accepting of information without very much processing, reflective open-mindedness (or active open-mindedness; e.g.,
Baron, Scott, Fincher & Metz, 2014) results from a mindset
that searches for information as a means to facilitate critical
analysis and reflection. Thus, the former should cause one
to be more receptive of bullshit whereas the latter, much like
analytic cognitive style, should guard against it.
The foregoing highlights what appears to be a strong general susceptibility to bullshit, but what cognitive mechanisms inoculate against bullshit? Drawing on recent dualprocess theories that posit a key role for conflict detection
in reasoning (De Neys, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015), we
proposed that people may vary in their ability to detect bullshit. Our results modestly support this claim. Namely, we
created a bullshit “sensitivity” measure by subtracting profundity ratings for pseudo-profound bullshit from ratings for
legitimate motivational quotations. Increased bullshit sensitivity was associated with better performance on measures
of analytic thinking. This is consistent with Sagan’s (1996)
famous claim that critical thinking facilitates “baloney detection”.
Further, bullshit sensitivity was associated with lower
paranormal belief, but not conspiratorial ideation or acceptance of complementary and alternative medicine. This was
not predicted as all three forms of belief are considered
“epistemically suspect” (e.g., Pennycook, et al., in press).
One possible explanation for this divergence is that supernatural beliefs are a unique subclass because they entail
a conflict between some immaterial claim and (presumably universal) intuitive folk concepts (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). For example, the belief in ghosts conflicts with
folk-mechanics – that is intuitive belief that objects cannot pass through solid objects (Boyer, 1994). Pennycook
et al. (2014) found that degree of belief in supernatural religious claims (e.g., angels, demons) is negatively correlated
with conflict detection effects in a reasoning paradigm. This
result suggests that the particularly robust association between pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity and supernatural beliefs may be because both response bias and conflict
detection (sensitivity) support both factors. Further research
is needed to test this claim.
17.2Future directions
The focus of this work was on investigating individual differences in the tendency to accept bullshit statements, and
our initial evidence indicates that reflectiveness may be a
key individual difference variable. At a very basic level,
the willingness to stop and think analytically about the actual meanings of the presented words and their associations
would seem an a priori defense against accepting bullshit
at face value (i.e., to avoid an excessively open-minded response bias). Moreover, increased detection of bullshit may
reinforce a critical attitude and potentially engender a more
restrained attitude to profundity judgments. The present
findings also provide evidence that an increased knowledge
of word meaning (via verbal intelligence) may assist in
critical analysis. An understanding of more precisely nuanced meanings of words may reveal inconsistencies, incongruities, and conflicts among terms in bullshit statements.
Conflict detection is a key aspect of dual-process theories
(e.g., De Neys, 2012; Pennycook, et al., 2015), though in
this case it remains unclear precisely what features of bullshit statements might cue reflective thinking. What is it
about a statement like “good health imparts reality to subtle
creativity” that might cause someone to stop and consider
the meaning of the sentence more deeply?
Although a reflective thinking style appears to militate
against bullshit acceptance, other cognitive processes that
underlie the propensity to find meaning in meaningless
statements remain to be elucidated. It may be that people
naturally assume that statements presented in a psychology
study (vague or otherwise) are constructed with the goal
of conveying some meaning. Indeed, the vagueness of the
statements may imply that the intended meaning is so important or profound that it cannot be stated plainly (Sperber, 2010). In the current work, we presented the participants with meaningless statements without cueing them to
the possibility that they are complete bullshit. Although
this is likely how bullshit is often encountered in everyday
life, it may be that some skepticism about the source of the
statement is the key force that may guard against bullshit
acceptance. For example, poems attributed to prestigious
sources are evaluated more positively (Bar-Hillel, Maharshak, Moshinsky & Nofech, 2012). Interpretation is difficult
and humans surely rely on simple heuristics (e.g., “do I trust
the source?”) to help with the task.
In this vein, psychological research should aim to elucidate contextual factors that interact with individual differences in the reception and detection of bullshit. As noted by
philosophers studying the topic, the bullshitter oft has the
intention of implying greater meaning than is literally contained in the message, though the nature of the intent can
vary. For example, the literary critic Empson (1947) describes the use of ambiguity in literature, including a type
of intentional ambiguity used by poets in which a passage
“says nothing, by tautology, by contradiction, or by irrelevant statements; so that the reader is forced to invent statements of his own . . . ” (p. 176). The employment and reception of such literary devices in the context of a broader
meaningful work seems related to but dissociable from isolated statements such as those used here. By examining
pseudo-profound bullshit in an empirical fashion, we set
the stage for further refinement of this important conceptual
