of his goods in the customer's presence. In all these instances the object of the seller is to get a higher price than his goods would really produce if their quality were known; and the purchaser, if not himself a skilful judge (which rarely happens to be the case), must pay some person, in the shape of an additional money price, who has skill to distinguish, and integrity to furnish, articles of the quality agreed on. But as the confidence of persons in their own judgment is usually great, large numbers will always flock to the cheap dealer, who thus, attracting many customers from the honest tradesman, obliges him to charge a higher price for his judgment and character than, without such competition, he could afford to do.
(189.) There are few things which the public are less able to judge of than the quality of drugs; and when these are compounded into medicines it is scarcely possible, even for medical men, to decide whether pure or adulterated ingredients have been employed. This circumstance, concurring with the present injudicious mode of paying for medical assistance, has produced a curious effect on the price of medicines. Apothecaries, instead of being paid for their services and skill, are remunerated by being allowed to place a high charge upon their medicines, which are confessedly of very small pecuniary value. The effect of such a system is an inducement to prescribe more medicine than is necessary; and in fact, even with the present charges, the apothecary, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, cannot be fairly remunerated unless the patient either takes, or pays for, more physic than he really requires. The apparent extravagance of the charge of eighteen-pence