usually ends in a monopoly, and the public are then left to the discretion of the monopolists not to charge them above the "growling point;"—that is, not to make them pay so much as to induce them actually to combine against the imposition. This occurs when two companies supply water or gas to consumers by means of pipes laid down under the pavement in the streets of cities: it may possibly occur also in docks, canals, rail-roads, &c., and in other cases where the capital required is very large, and the competition very limited. If water or gas companies combine, the public immediately loses all the advantage of competition, and it has generally happened, that at the end of a period during which they have undersold each other, the several companies have agreed to divide the whole district supplied, into two or more parts, each company then removing its pipes from all the streets except those in its own portion. This removal causes great injury to the pavement, and when the pressure of increased rates induces a new company to start, the same inconvenience is again produced. Perhaps one remedy against evils of this kind might be, when a charter is granted to such companies, to restrict, to a certain amount, the rate of profit on the shares, and to direct that any profits beyond, shall accumulate for the repayment of the original capital. This has been done in several late acts of parliament establishing companies. The maximum rate of profit allowed ought to be liberal, to compensate for the risk; the public ought to have auditors on their part, and the accounts should be annually published, for the purpose of preventing the limitations from being exceeded. It must however
