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The argument of the Epicureans, against ⟨Providence⟩, agrees well with their doctrine concerning the beginning of the world, and is every whit foolish and unreasonable
They tell us, that such an attendance upon the ⟨works⟩ of nature and the actions of men. as Providence ⟨implies⟩ is too mean for God's supreme greatness, and ⟨too⟩ troublesome for his complete happiness; that his enjoyments and satisfactions would be interrupted with ⟨his⟩ cares: that he must be wearied with the endless continuance, and distracted with the infinite variety of ⟨them⟩ that men are too inconsiderable, for him to regard ⟨what⟩ they do; that he is so far from being concerned, ⟨from⟩ being either pleased or angry with them, that he is so much as a spectator of their actions: worshipping ⟨or⟩ blaspheming him, doing right or wrong to one ⟨another⟩ is all alike; nothing can move him to take notice, ⟨no⟩ less to interpose, or meddle to do them either good ⟨or⟩ harm. This kind of reasoning was justly despised ⟨for⟩ the weakness in it, and justly suspected to be ⟨rather⟩ crafty insinuation of Atheism, and a pursuance of ⟨their⟩ design against religion, than a way of good and ⟨conclusive⟩ arguing, even in their own opinion.
How could men, that discourse clearly and constantly in many other matters, fall into such a gross ⟨mistake⟩ as to conclude concerning the nature of God ⟨which is⟩ infinitely perfect, from the defects and imperfection ⟨of⟩ a man?
Because we cannot attend long, nor to many things ⟨at once⟩, but are tired with thinking, and perplexed ⟨with⟩
