it were otherwise it could hardly sit as an impartial arbiter in many cases of vital moment to the commonwealth and its citizens. It must not be understood by this that the court should be unmindful of the current of events that set in motion policies of government, for it is by giving heed to them that it is enabled to interpret the laws and ordinances of the lawmaking bodies and to administer justice intelligently. Alike with the other departments, the judiciary is subject to the influence of public opinion, that consensus of individual thought that moulds and gives caste to measures and political action in government. In epitome, it should not be swayed and tossed about by every shifting breese that is in one quarter to-day and in another to-morrow, but it should be ever sensitive of the gulf streams, the deep running currents, which are of the sea. Judgments can not .stand against public opinion any more than the promulgation of laws and executive decrees, for they will in some way be avoided and their force as precedents destroyed. A peculiarly striking incident of the kind is the decision in the Dred Scott case, which in its political aspects has been accounted vulnerable and has been wholly disregarded. The most searching yet courteous criticism of this case was one made by the illustrious patriot and citizen whose name we honor on this occasion. It has gone down in history and was so skillful and masterly as to defy successful disputation. You will readily recall the political conditions then prevalent. Franklin Pierce was the outgoing and James Buchanan the incoming president, both of whom had referred in public utterances to the forthcoming decision of the supreme court; Roger B. Taney, who rendered the prevailing opinion, was chief justice; and Stephen A. Douglas, the champion of the Nebraska Doctrine. After putting numerous questions touching the action of these men and the delay in the
