OCCUPATION OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER 291 sented themselves to me, relative to the probable difficulty of making an establishment at the mouth of Columbia River, and the military advantages of that establishment," I have the honor to remark, that ever since my attention was first directed to the subject, I have con- sidered the possession and military command of the Columbia necessary not only to the protection of the fur trade, but to the security of our Western frontier. That flank of our country, extending from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, is everywhere in contact with numerous, powerful, and warlike Indian nations; who, altogether, might be able to bring into the field, from twenty to thirty thousand warriors. Most of these nations communicate, either with the British to the north and west, or the Spaniards to the south. In the event of war, that force, with a few hundred foreign troops, or under the influence of foreign companies, might be made more formidable to us than any force which Europe combined could oppose to us. On the other hand, if such measures be adopted as to secure a proper influence over them, and, in the event of war, to command their co-operation, they, with the aid of a few small garrisons, would not only afford ample protection for that entire line, but would become the scourge of our enemies. The dangers to be apprehended, can only be averted by proper military 'establishments; and whether the post at the mouth of the Columbia be intended to secure our territory, protect our traders, or to cut off all communication between the Indians and foreigners, I should consider a line of posts extending from the Council Bluffs entirely across the continent necessary. Those posts should be situated, as well with a view to command the avenues through which the Indians pass from north to south, as to keep open the communication with the establishment at the mouth of the Columbia. A post should be established at the Mandan villages, because there the Missouri approaches within a short distance of the British terri- tory, and it would have the effect of holding in check the Hudson Bay and North West Companies, and of controlling the Bickarees, Man- dans, Minnatarees, Assiniboins, and other Indians, who either reside or range on the territory east, north, and west of that point. A post at, or near, the head of navigation on th'e Missouri, would control the Blackfoot Indians, protect our traders, enable us to remove those of the British companies from our territory, and serve as a depot, at which detachm'ents moving towards the Columbia might either be supplied, or leave such stores as they should find it difficult to carry with them through the mountains. It might also be made a depot of trade, and of the Indian Department. To keep open the communication through the mountains, there should be at least one small post at some convenient point between
