OCCUPATION OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER. 293 tribes, and deter them from acts of outrage upon our traders. They might, also, during the winter, reconnoitre the s'everal passes through the mountains, prepare provisions necessary to support them on the march, and down the Columbia; and, if authorized to do so, remove from our territories all British traders on the waters of the Missouri. They would necessarily remain at, or in the vicinity of, their winter- ing ground, until June, but might be occupied during th'e months of April and May in opening a road to the mountains and constructing bridges over the numerous streams on the route. This work performed, they might, in about twenty days, reach the navigable waters of Clark's Eiver, a branch of the Columbia, and, in ten days more, prepare transportation to descend to their destination, where, after every necessary allowance for accidents and delays, they would cer- tainly arrive by the month of August. The vess'els employed to transport the stores by sea, might leave the United States in the month of November, and would arrive at the mouth of the Columbia in April, at least four months before the detachment from the Council Bluffs could reach that point; and, unless the ships should be detained during that time, which could not be expected, the stores would be exposed to damage and depredation, and, perhaps, by the time the troops should arrive, would be entirely destroyed. It would, therefore, seem to me a measure of prudence that at least one company of artillery be transported with the stores. That description of force would be found necessary at the post, and the ships would afford them ample accommodation. That the route from the Council Bluffs to the mouth of Columbia is practicable, has been proved by the enterprise of more than one of our citizens. It, no doubt, presents difficulties; but, difficulties are not impossibilities. We have only to refer to the pages of our history to learn that many operations, infinitely more arduous, have been accom- plished by Americans. The march of Arnold to Quebec, or of General Clark to Vincennes, during the Kevolutionary War, exceeded greatly in fatigue, privation, difficulty, and danger, the proposed operation; and I believe I may say, without fear of contradiction, that the de- tachment might be supplied, during the whole route, with less difficulty than in the war of 1756 was experienced in supplying the forces' operating under Gen'eral Washington, and General Braddock, against the French and Indians on the Ohio. A post at the mouth of the Columbia is important, not only in relation to the interior trade, and the military defense of th'e western section of the Union, but also in relation to the naval power of the Nation. Naval power consists, not in ships, but in seamen; and, to be efficient, the force must always be available. The northwest coast of Ameiica is an admirable nursery for seamen many of our best sailors
