On Power to Increase Supreme Court 85 them, are far in excess, and in most states from one-third to three times the salaries now paid the justices of the Supreme Court of this state. It is admitted that these are reasons that commend themselves to the policy and necessity of the passage of some measure for the relief of the court. And it is con- ceded that the only real objection is not to the measure itself, nor is it denied that there is necessity almost controlling, but it is claimed that the act is and ought to be declared unconsti- tutional. It is a primary rule of construction to govern courts and I assume also the legislative branch of the government, that a statute will not be and ought not to be declared uncon- stitutional unless upon a fair interpretation of the case in the light of the constitution it can be said to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. The question, therefore, is not whether or not there is some doubt as to the constitutionality of the pending measure, but whether or not a member of the legislative assembly or the Supreme Court, in passing upon such question, can say that beyond a reasonable doubt the statute proposed is or will be unconstitutional. If it is a mere matter of doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of the law or of the measure that is proposed. See Umatilla Irrigation Co. v. Barnhart, 22 Or. 389 ; Crowley v. State, 11 Or. 513; Cline v. Greenwood, 10 Or. 330; Cook v. Port of Portland, 30 Or. 583 ; Cresap v. Gray, 10 Or. 345 ; David v. Portland Water Committee, 14 Or. 33 : Crawford v. Board, 12 Or. 447; Deane v. Willamette Bridge Co., 22 Or. 167; Simon v. Northrup, 27 Or. 437. As said by Mr. Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limi- tations, 5th Ed., page 216, "It has been said by an eminent jurist that when courts are called upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation passed with all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of law, they will approach the question with great caution, examine it in every
