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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 97. | The Defense member of the NSC Planning Board indicates the options available to the U.S. with regard to the Geneva results. General Bonesteel suggests that the increased risks associated with pressuring France to continue the war and possible U.S. intervention to stop the communist advance can "more surely and safely be accepted now than ever again." On the other hand, a compromise at Geneva would lead to communist subversion at a late date and U.S. involvement then might be inhibited by an increased Soviet nuclear capability. "Asia could thus be lost." General Bonesteel Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 1954 | 442 |
| 98. | The draft instructions for the Geneva Delegation, which have been approved by the President are sent to the Defense Department for comment. According to the instructions, the U.S. is "an interested nation which, however, is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation." State Department Letter to R. B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10 May 1954 | 443 |
| 99. | France is convinced it is facing Communist China at Dien Bien Phu not Viet Minh rebels. The French request the aid of competent U.S. military advice, i.e., a U.S. General to confer with General Ely on regrouping forces in Indochina. Paris 4287 to Dulles, 10 May 1954 | 446 |
| 100. | The United States "posture" at Geneva is interpreted as "to cheer the players" rather than "to pitch." The draft instructions to the Geneva delegation imply a "profound point" -- will the U.S. admit diplomatic defeat and cease to use the conference toward its ends if the conference appears to go against the U.S.? General Bonesteel Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10, May 1954 | 449 |
| 101. | The President approves informing the French of his conditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina. Even though premature, the decision to internationalize the war must be made. President Eisenhower would ask Congressional authority to commit U.S. forces provided: (1) there was a French request, (2) that other nations would be requested and would accept, (3) that the UN would be notified, (4) that France guarantees independence in the French Union to the Associated States, including the option to withdraw at any time, (5) that France would not withdraw its forces after the intervention, and (6) that an agreed on structure for united action is reached. Dulles 4023 to Paris, 11 May 1954 | 451 |
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