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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 115. | The White House views the JCS position on intervention in Indochina as not involving any new policy issue relative to NSC 5405. However, a pencilled Secretary of Defense marginal note indicates that the White House "misses the point" -- the JCS was considering the "regional grouping" and others in the grouping, i.e., U.K. may object to NSC 5405 policy. Hence the JCS is warning "not to get involved in such a grouping" unless all parties accept direct action. White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1954 | 494 |
| 116. | Ely emphasizes particular points to Trapnell and Dillon: (1) Ely was not in accord with O'Daniel's proposal to reorganize the Vietnamese army on a divisional basis, (2) O'Daniel's operational war plan was unrealistic, (3) the increasing frequency of American criticism of French conduct of the war was not appreciated, (4) Ely was regrouping his forces for defense of the Delta, and (5) one or two U.S. Marine divisions could assure defense of the Delta. Paris 4566 to Dulles 27 May 1954 | 495 |
| 117. | The U.S . Delegation to Geneva clearly sees a forthcoming settlement which the U.S., under NSC, cannot associate itself with. Both the dangers of partition and impossibility of armistice supervision in Indochina are recognized. "There is very little that the Defense Department can do to influence the negotiations, since a political decision has been made that the U.S. will continue to participate" even though partition will ultimately result in loss of Indochina to communism. Geneva Delegate Letter to Admiral Davis, 28 May 1954 | 498 |
| 118. | The French suggest that the U.S. take over responsibility for training the Vietnamese National Army and provide assistance toward improving airfields for jet aircraft use in Indochina. Paris 4580 to Dulles, 28 May 1954 | 500 |
| 119. | Dillon clarifies apparent misunderstanding in Washington on French understanding of U.S. intervention if Red China attacks Indochina. Paris 4607 to Dulles, 30 May 1954 | 503 |
| 120. | Schuman, Ely, and Laniel inform Dillon and Trapnell that France regards the present bilateral negotiations as a "prelude to U.S. intervention should Geneva fail" or should the communists drag negotiations to obtain a military decision in the Delta. The French pursue reassurance of U.S. intervention if Red China launches an all-out air attack. Paris 4612 to Dulles, 31 May 1954 | 506 |
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