Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/181

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

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b. Political aspects: While it might be possible to secure UN action for armed assistance to the Associated States, it would be difficult to stave off pressure for a negotiated settlement or UN mediation. It would be possible to develop a regional grouping with maximum Asian participation if it were clear that the US had decided to commit forces to the area. France would prefer a regional grouping to UN sponsored assistance. The Associated States would prefer UN sponsored assistance. The Free World reaction would be somewhat more favorable to action as a part of a regional grouping than to US unilateral action.

c. Reaction to US use of nuclear weapons: Same as Case I.

d. Soviet bloc reaction: Even though the US was participating as one of a regional group, the chances of overt Chinese Communist aggression would remain substantial.

e. Foreign aid considerations: Expenditures would probably be greater than in Case I because the US would be called upon to support the forces of the additional participating states.

5. Alternative C: US acting in concert with others or alone.

a. Military requirements: Assuming no serious deterioration in the military situation prior to US take-over from the French of responsibility for military operations:

(1) Ground forces: Indigenous forces of 330,000; 6 Infantry and 1 Airborne Division of US or Allied troops, plus 275,000 support personnel.

(2) Air Forces: 1 Fighter Wing, 1 Light Bomber Wing, 1 Troop Carrier (Wing), 2 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, 1 Fighter Bomber Wing and 1 Tactical Control Squadron.

(3) Naval Forces: 1 Carrier Task Group, plus additional mining and support units.

b. Logistic implications: Case III can be supported without major logistical implications provided production schedules are maintained at approximately Korean War levels.

c. Impact on US military programs: As this course would involve accepting an increased calculated risk of war with Communist China or of general war, it would require a reversal of present policy planning to reduce the size of the US armed forces.

d. Political aspects: French disassociation would enhance support for UN action or for a regional grouping. It would also end France's role as a major power. Most of the Free World would support US intervention.

e. Soviet bloc reaction: Same as in Case II.

f. Foreign aid considerations: Same as in Case II, although savings in the US contribution for the support of French forces in Indochina would partially offset the greatly increased cost of US forces taking their place.