NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
a few exceptions to this, such as army ammunition, where monthly reports are submitted by the French on stock levels and consumption. However the stock levels for the bulk of the supplies and equipment cannot be determined or reconciled to any specific leve. The MAAG in their comment on the cost study stated that the French must have at least a six-month stock level of supplies in the theater. However, the MAAG was unable to state in specific terms what actually constituted a six-month level or what constitutes any militarily satisfactory level for Indochina.
In the army ammunition area, as noted in Table II, if the current high rates continue, a shortage of 60 mm mortar shells and 105 mm howitzer shells will occur, while present MDAP programming will result in an oversupply of 30 caliber carbine cartridges, 57 mm rile shells, and 155mm howitzer shells. With available consumption data, rough requirements can be developed to serve as a basis for logistical planning to prevent the crash approach that has been necessary recently. While some consideration must be given to the MAAG position that lacking data on the operational plans of the French, it is impossible to state what constitutes a definitive operational level, estimates for planning purposes are still necessary and can be made based on the available consumption data.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The French should be required to furnish the MAAG the quantity and location of stock levels and operational reserves currently maintained by type of equipment and supply and what is projected,
The levels of supply required in Indochina are dependent on the extent of logistical back-up outside the theater, the capabilities of the logistical organization in Indochina and such other factors as transportation and communication facilities within the theater. It is recommended that qualified logistical personnel be assigned to make a study of the logistical support situation in Indochina in order to determine what levels are required in the theater to support the operation.
MILITARY PERSONNEL COSTS: There is insufficient information available from American sources in Saigon to validate either the French or DC/E estimates of pay and allowances, nor is there a revised personnel plan available to show the effect of recent changes in forces foals on the personnel build-up. Embassy and STEM sources consider a pay increase for Associated States military personnel a distinct probability most likely taking the form of non-repayment of the annual New Year's (TET) advance of one month's pay. Average pay data submitted to DC/E in Paris indicates French expectation of a 20% pay increase for those Associated States personnel as well as indigenous personnel with French Forces beyond calendar 1955, although this was not included in the budget. Such information as is available on food and clothing points to some upward revision of the DC/E estimate.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That the French be requested to furnish revised personnel plans showing the phased build-up as it relates to latest force objectives.
2. That in order to validate estimates of food costs, the French be requested to provide:
SECRET
