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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 138. | It is in the best interests of the U.S. that final adjournment of the Conference take place unless France wants to keep it alive. Eden's departure on a recess is seen as evidence of no reason to delay "collective talks on SEA defense." TEDUL 196, 14 June 1954 | 561 |
| 139. | The CIA estimates communist reactions to the participation of U.S. air and naval forces at various levels of intensity and on various targets in conjunction with French Union forces in Indochina. Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 10-4-54, 15 June 1954 | 563 |
| 140. | Dulles cites an alternative that "if and when " a French Government which had the confidence of the Assembly should decide to continue the war, as opposed to an unacceptable armistice, the U.S. would be prepared to respond promptly. TEDUL 208, 16 June 1954 | 570 |
| 141. | Viet Minh demand all of Tonkin area including Hanoi and Haiphong in secret talks with France. The U.S. informs France that "we did not wish to be.…abruptly confronted with agreement…" as a result of secret negotiations and suggest a U.S. liaison officer. DULTE 187, 16 June 1954 | 572 |
| 142. | China and the Soviet Union are "greatly concerned" over any break-up of the Indochina conference. Eden expresses the view that China wants a settlement but doubts their degree of control over the Viet Minh. DULTE 193, 17 June 1954 | 574 |
| 143. | The "underground military talks" at Geneva are pointing toward a de facto partition of Indochina. "There can of course be no repeat no question of U.S. participation in any attempt to 'sell' a partition to non-communist Vietnamese. TEDUL 212, 17 June 1954 | 576 |
| 144. | U.S. re-examines possible de facto partition of Vietnam in light of five-power staff report suggesting Thakhek-Donghoi line. TEDUL 222, 18 June 1954 | 577 |
| 145. | The French feel that partition is the best settlement they could have worked for under the conditions laid down by U.S. for intervention which "no French Parliament would approve." Partition should come as no surprise to the Vietnamnese since the Viet Minh had wade it clear to them -- "coalition government or partition." DULTE 195 , 18 June 1954 | 578 |
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