NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
| Control: | 12206 |
| Rec'd: | April 29, 1954 |
| 6:10 a.m. |
| FROM: | Geneva |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | DULTE 21, April 29, 10 a. m. |
EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY.
Developments have been so rapid and almost every hour so filled with high-level talks that evaluation has been difficult. My present estimates follow:
(1) Indochina: Delay in fall of Dien Bien Phu has resulted in some French discounting of this development. Nevertheless, it must be assumed the French will not continue in any long-range operation unless it will defeinitely relieve the strain on French manpower in Indochina. Present French Government holding on because their Parliament in recess and probably no one eager to take over at this juncture. Bidault given considerable discretion because present Cabinet cannot make up its mind on any course. Therefore, we do not have anyone on French side with whom we can make any dependable agreements. After deputies return and Dien Bien Phu falls, there may well be a change of government, probably to the left, committed to liquidate Indochina. However, this is more easily said than done and it is possible that as this fact develops a French Government might be prepared to sit down with us seriously and consider some joint program which is something that so far they have evaded.
I do not know whether from military standpoint it would be deemed feasible to end the scattering and exposure of military forces for local political reasons and withdraw present forces to defensible enclaves in deltas where they would have US sea and air protection meanwhile retain enough territory and enough prestige to develop really effective indigenous army along lines suggested by O'Daniel. This might, I suppose, take two years and would require in large part taking over training responsibility by US. Also full independence and increased economic aid would probably be required to help maintain friendly governments in areas chosen for recruitment.
I do not have any idea as to whether this is militarily feasible and Admiral Davis inclines to view that it is not. However,
from political
