NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
the necessary support — artillery, engineers , armor, communications — taking into account the very special character of the war in Indochina, the terrain--the enemy. To bring about a maximum of cooperation with the Air Force and the Navy.
e. To maintain a reserve of special type units -- armor, commando, light battalion, etc., for attachment to groups and divisions in accordance with terrain and mission.
f. To continue the effort of instructing and organizing the army of the Associated states so as to give them more and more participation as well as more and more autonomy in the conduct of operations.
Note: The above was given to General O'Daniel in writing by General Navarre on 29 June 1953 and was thereafter referred to as the Navarre concept for the successful conclusion of war in Indochina.
Few, of these aims are progressing satisfactorily. The training of the National armies is woefully inefficient and the series of tactical offensive operations engaged in during 1953-54 fighting season, instead of retaking the initiative has lost it to t he Viet Minh. After a rather encouraging beginning with the Lang Son operation, Navarre's later operations reveal that he is following the same conservative defensive tactics as his predecessor, General Salan. Although Mouette was highly publicized as a successful offensive, it in fact was nothing but a reconnaissance in force with the objective of occupying a strong position and awaiting attack by the enemy in the hope of dealing him a crippling blow. The enemy refused to be taken in. The current campaign season has been dominated by the Viet Minh, and the present position of the French Union Forces is no improvement over that of last year. Dien Bien Phu is not only another Na San but a grave tactical and strategic error. The only hope for gain from the battle now raging is that the French can survive. The French have consistently postponed seizure of the initiative through failure to select and pursue vital military objectives such as the obvious enemy troop concentration depot and communications area in the foothills north of the Tonkin delta. Viet Minh leadership, on the other hand, has capitalized on this vacated opportunity by seizing and holding the initiative. The French battle corps, which was built up hopefully by energetic withdrawal of implanted units, has now been dissipated into four sizeable components: (1) Dien Bien Phu -- 12 battalions -- an expensive-supplied airhead, is encircled and under heavy attack. (2) Seno-Savannakhet-Thakhek-Pakse area -- 15 battalions -- partially supported by air with its overland communications threatened. (3) Operation Atlanta -- 25 battalions -- a coastline sweep north from Nha Trang, which has uncovered no appreciable enemy, and (4) the Tonkin delta -- 18 battalions -- where the enemy is increasing his attacks on rear installations and lines of communications. The lack of initiative which the French have is emphasized by the day-to-day reaction of the French to enemy moves and activity as expressed in recent requests for emergency assistance in the way of U.S. equipment and maintenance personnel.
French tactics are based primarily on defense, even though French Union Forces outnumber Viet Minh forces by almost 2 to 1, have overwhelming fire power, and upopposed air force, a balanced naval force and strategic transport capability. The barbed wire concept is exemplified by the fact that the French have established a requirement of 4000 tons of this item per month over and above that furnished by France. The bulk of the C-119 airlift for Dien Bien Phu supply was utilized in dropping barbed wire.
