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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
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| 161. | Dillon discovers that the U.S. complaints of not being informed are proved unjustified on the French withdrawal in Tonkin. Both State and Defense were notified via Trapnell's hand-carried plans and diplomatic cables. Public statements thus "can only serve to make our position here vis-a-vis Mendes and his government increasingly difficult and undermine the confidence of both the French Government and people in our candor…" Paris 81 to Dulles, 7 July 1954 | 618 |
| 162. | "I have never harbored any thought of wilful concealment…there is a certain lack of intimacy…" in relations with the present government. The U.S. intends to leave representation at Geneva but not Bedell Smith nor Dulles will return. The U.S. should avoid a "position at Geneva…" Dulles 85 to Paris, 8 July 1954 | 619 |
| 163. | The Chinese inform Ambassador Johnson that Chou En-lai had a ""very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and that "results would be helpful to the French." The French believe that the Sino-Soviet positions have been coordinated with the Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight. SECTO 578, 9 July 1954 | 622 |
| 164. | The Defense Department queries the State Department regarding equipping three French light infantry divisions for Indochina in view of (1) the Premier's promise to end the war by 20 July and (2) the considerable impact of equipment removal on NATO. Defense Letter to State, 9 July 1954 | 624 |
| 165. | President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles indicate firmly to President Mendes-France the rationale behind not sending Dulles or General Smith back to Geneva. Essentially, the rationale is based on failure of the U.S., U.K. and France to agree on a joint position at Geneva and lack of agreement on a "united action" proposal if the position is not accepted by the communists. Dulles sees France and U.K. enhancing a communist "whittling-away" process by readily accepting less than the seven points. Dulles 127 to Paris, 10 July 1954 | 625 |
| 166. | France views the Dulles decision as (1) making the French bargaining position weaker and (2) that Europe would interpret U.S. absence from Geneva as a step in the "return to a policy of isolationism." Paris 134 to Dulles, 11 July 1954 | 631 |
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