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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9 May 1954

INİERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Future U. S. Action Regarding Indo-China

1. In light of the French having tabled an armistice proposal at Geneva, the United States must now decide whether:

a. To intervene actively in the Indo-China war to redeem the situation.

b. To exercise all feasible pressure to require the French Government to avoid all compromise at Geneva and to take increased effective military and political action against the Viet Minh in Indo-China. This appears realistically possible only if the decision to implement the above is also made.

c. To adopt a passive policy toward the negotiations at Geneva while endeavoring to organize hastily a regional grouping, with U.S. participation, to hold what remains or southeast Asia.

2. Decisions a plus b offer he only sure way to stop the Communist advance. They involve substantial risk of war with Red China and increased risk of general war. However, recognizing the steadily increasing Soviet capabilities in nuclear warfare and the consequent steady diminution of the present military advantage of the U.S. over the USSR, these, increased risks can more surely and safely be accepted now then ever again.

3. Decision c would be a compromise involving clear possibilities of piecemeal advancement of Communist control over the balance of free Asia despite the best efforts of the U.S. to the contrary. The likelihood of further such advancement would be somewhat diminished if the U.S. made publicly clear that the further support by Moscow and Peiping of Communist aggression or subversion, as judged by the U.S., would entail direct military action by the U.S. against the source or sources of this support. However, it might be months or years before further subversion would enable such a U.S. judgment. By then the increased Soviet nuclear capability might well inhibit the U.S. Government from implementing its announced intention. Asia could thus be lost.

4. Therefore, it would appear that the U.S. Government must decide whether to take the steps necessary to contain Communism in Asia within Red China by intervention in Indo-China or accept the probable loss of Asia to Communism.

C. H. BONESTEEL, III
Brigadier General, United States Army
Defense Member, NSC Planning Board

 

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