NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
| Control: | 14091 |
| Rec'd: | May 31, 1954 |
| 9:32 A.M. |
| FROM: | PARIS |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | 4612, MAY 31, 1PM |
PRIORITY
SENT DEPARTMENT 4512, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 327
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
When Trapnell and I arrived at Laniel's house for meeting this morning, we found Maurice Schumann and Ely also present. The meeting was short and it was confirmed that Ely would go to Washington for bilateral military talks. His missions will ostensibly be to attend five-power military talks, and it is fully understood that bilateral negotiations will remain secret. Ely is unable to arrive Washington this week and Vallhy has been authorized to represent him both at five-power talks and at commencement of bilateral negotiations which Ely stated he understood here to cover training of local troops , command structure and war plans. Valluy will also arrange date for Ely's arrival with JCS. Ely said he was going London tomorrow for one day visit with Hardine whom he does not rpt not know well , for purpose of making friendly contact prior to opening of five-power talks.
Laniel once more mentioned French fear of Chinese Communist air attack. He made it clear that French regard present bilateral negotiations as a preclude to U.S. intervention should Geneva fail or should communists drag negotiations at Geneva while attempting to obtain a military decision in the delta. On the other hand, Lanier clearly considers that an all-out air attack on the delta by the Chinese, while not rpt not likely, is a possibility and should be planned for. He feels that such an attack would completely change the present situation and wants the best assurances possible of prompt U.S. help in the event of such a Chinese attack. Ely confirmed that his understanding with Radford on this subject was purely a technical one between Chiefs of Staff and was subject to political decision by U.S. He said that Radford had plans ready so that U.S. assistance could come very rapidly once the political decision had been made. I informed Laniel that after my meeting with Schumann Saturday night at which Schumann had raised the subject, I had sent an inquiry on Sunday to Washington explaining in full French view that (1) U.S. intervention because of continuation and aggrevation of present military situation in Indochina, and (2) U.S.
TOP SECRET
