NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
-2- 179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Paris.
which apply to the situation the principles of non-use of forces which are embodied in Article 2 (4) and (6) of the Charter of the United Nations.
4. The United States is prepared to seek, with other interested nations, a collective defense association designed to preserve, against direct and indirect aggression, the integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia following any settlement.
5. If there is no (repeat no) settlement, the United States and French Governments will consult together on the measures to be taken. This will not (repeat not) preclude the United States, if it so desires, bringing the matter before the United Nations as involving a threat to peace as dealt with by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
6. France reaffirms the principle of independence for the Associated States in equal and voluntary association as members of the French Union.
UNQUOTE
B. Annex to above document consisting of the 7 points regarding a settlement which could be respected as agreed during Churchill-Eisenhower conversations. (Please note following phrase which has been added with the full consent of Eden and Mendes-France at the beginning of paragraph 2 of the 7 points.) In connection with the line of military demarcation, preserves --"
"Memorandum of points referred to in paragraph 2 of the France-United States position paper.
An agreement which:
"1. Preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces therefrom;
"2. In connection with the line of military demarcation preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam and if possible an enclave in the deltas; in this connection, we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi;
"3. Does not (repeat not) impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces
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