NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
| Control: | 5952 |
| Rec'd: | July 14, 1954 |
| FROM: | Paris |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | 179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) |
PRIORITY
SENT DEPARTMENT 179 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 45, GENEVA 27
It being your belief that the continuation of the war would involve a serious risk of an extension of the conflict, both as concerns the combat areas and the belligerent countries, the question of the participation of the United States would be guided by the terms defined in the fourth paragraph of the letter addressed on June 16, 1954, by President Eisenhower to President Coty.
You have indicated to me that you would fear, in the present state of negotiations, that the sending by the United States to Geneva of representatives chosen at a high level and bearing instructions from President Eisenhower to adhere to the principles noted above, could cause a situation capable of giving rise in France, under the most regrettable circumstances, to a feeling that our two countries are divided and that it might risk affecting seriously their good relations which are so important to the whole free world.
I have noted your hesitation to come to Geneva in the fear of having eventually to disassociate yourself from an agreement, or certain of its terms, which you might not (repeat not) be able to respect. This appears to me to be understandable, but in my opinion it does not (repeat not) respond to the situation. In effect, I have every reason to think that your absence would be precisely interpreted as demonstrating, before the fact, that you disapproved of the conference and of everything which might be accomplished. Not (repeat not) only would those who are against us find therein the confirmation of the ill will which they attribute to your government concerning the re-establishment of peace in Indochina; but many others would. read in it a sure sign of a division of the western powers. Finally, the negotiations would thus be deprived of the element of balance indispensable to the seeking of a solution as recommended in the memorandum of June 30.
I consider thus that such an absence would produce an effect
SECRET
