NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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help in training. It was agreed that General O'Daniel should probably be first assigned as Chief of MAAG and that, for this reason, General Dabney's departure for Indochina should be temporarily held up. General Dabney should, however go to Indochina to assist, General O'Daniel by heading up the present MAAG functions. Admiral Davis was requested to assure that General Dabney did not depart until further instructions were given.
14. There was some discussion, initiated by Mr. Kyes, about ways by which the French Foreign Legion in Indochina might be augmented. He felt that if the German and French Governments would facilitate it, considerable numbers of Germans might be enlisted to increase the Legion. Mr. Kyes mentioned several other general courses of action he thought should be further considered by the Special Committee and then suggested that General Erskine read his paper on the subject of Indochina. Mr. Kyes made it plain he considered this paper only a point of departure for further work by the Special Committee. General Erskine then read the paper, copies of which were given to the members of the Special Committee.
15. Admiral Radford said he thought, in general, that the paper covered many important fields but he had one or two reservations. He felt, with regard to the recommendation on regional coordinator, that CINCPAC was, and should be, the man to head up regional coordination of the MAAGs. Mr. Kyes reiterated that the paper was only a point of departure and said he felt the basic trouble in trying to help in Indochina, was the attitude of the French Government. Mr. Allen Dulles said the French do not want us to become too involved in the conduct of operations in Indochina because they want to keep one foot on the negotiations stool.
16. Admiral Radford said he felt the paper was too restrictive in that was premised on U.S. action short of the contribution of U.S. combat forces. He said that the U.S. could not afford to let the Viet Minh take the Tonkin Delta. If this were lost, Indochina would be lost and the rest of Southeast Asia would fall. The psychological impact of such a loss would be unacceptable to the U.S. Indochina must have the highest possible priority in U.S. attention. He suggested the paper, when redrafted, sold have two parts, one based on no intervention with combat forces and a second part indicating what should be done to prepare against the contingency where U.S. combat forces would be needed. General Smith was generally agreeable to this approach.
17. It was agreed not to use the OCB facilities to support the Special Committee, but instead to set up a working group of representatives of the principals of the Special Committee to revise General Erskine's paper by the middle of the week, 31 January - 6 February.
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