NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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- departments. The arrangements for furnishing logistic support to the ROKA division would undoubtedly involve numerous difficulties;
- h. It would add to the complications and difficulties of French command relations in Indochina.
- i. It would be difficult to explain and justify to the American public the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina while still requiring the retention of United States ground forces in Korea. In all probability, serious criticism by the American public would ensue;
- j. The governments allied with us in Korea would experience similar difficulties, and this would impose additional strains upon our relations with our Allies in Korea;
- k. The situation would, in all likelihood, be widely exploited by Soviet bloc propaganda as a case of United States employment of hapless oriental puppets for the benefit of the white imperialists;
- l. A ROKA division committed in Indochina would be fighting a type of warfare entirely new to it, under conditions of climate and terrain completely foreign to its previous experience, and without the accustomed United States advisors at hand. It would lack the incentive of fighting in the defense of its homeland. If under these conditions the performance of the division were poor or indifferent, the reputation of United States training methods would suffer accordingly;
- m. The language barrier would be a considerable obstacle.
10. In the light of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military point of view and having due regard for the principal political and psychological factors having military implications, the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina at this time would not be in the best interests of the United States. Therefore the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that while President Rhee should be commended by our Government for his determination to combat communist aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, he should be told that we do not consider that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina at this time would be in the best interests of the Free World and therefore that we request he not make a formal offer to the Laotian Government.
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