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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 72. | "U. S. is doing everything possible…to prepare public, Congressional, and constitutional basis for united action in Indochina." However, such action is considered "impossible" except on a coalition basis with British Commonwealth participation. Dulles 3482 to Paris, 5 April 1954 | 359 |
| 73. | France feels that the time for formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will be decided in the next ten days at Dien Bien Phu. Dillon (Paris) 3729 to Dulles, 5 April 1954 | 360 |
| 74. | The National Security Council receives recommendations of the Planning Board on NSC Action 1074-A . The Board recommends that the U. S. intervene if necessary but continue to pressure the French and to support a regional defense grouping in Southeast Asia with maximum Asian participation. The NSC also receives an assessment of risks in intervention and alternative policies. NSC 192d Meeting (Item 1), 6 April 1954 | 361 |
| 75. | Eden feels the seriousness of the French military situation is exaggerated -- "French cannot lose the war between now and the coming of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it." London 4382 to Dulles, 6 April 1954 | 366 |
| 76. | Dulles emphasizes that unless a new element is interjected into Indochina situation, such as an ad hoc coalition of nations prepared to fight, the French will "sell-out" at Geneva. The U. K., Australia, and New Zealand attitude is the key to "united action" and it is believed that Red China would not intervene. Dulles 163 to Canberra, 6 April 1954 | 367 |
| 77. | The Maloney mission, which reviewed the Indochina cost study with the U. S. Country Team in Saigon, concludes that "it is not possible…to arrive at any reasonable estimate of cost" to the U. S. of materials for the Indochina war. The "crash requirements" and the French impression (from visiting U. S. officials) that all requests will be granted has kept the MDAP program in a "constant state of flux." Maloney Memorandum to Deputy Defense Comptroller, 7 April 1954 | 370 |
| 78. | Should Communist China intervene in Indochina with combat aircraft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that talks should. be initiated to provide for implementation of military actions as outlined in NSC 5405. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 8 April 1954 | 378 |
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