Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
5. Because of the importance of acting rapidly once we have made up our minds, I will cable my recommendations to Washington enroute home. 17/
Simultaneously with this cable, Taylor sent a second "eyes only" for the President, Chairman of the JCS, Director of CIA, McNamara, and Rusk and Alexis Johnson at State. The cable is a little confusing; for although it sets out to comment on "U.S. military forces" it concerns only the flood Task Force; not mentioning the various other types of military forces (helicopter companies, etc.) which were envisioned. The same slight confusion appears in the "eyes only for the President" cable on this issue to be quoted shortly. The impression Taylor's choice of language leaves is that the support forces (helicopter companies, expanded MAAG, etc.) he was recommending were essentially already agreed to by the President before Taylor left Washington, and consequently his detailed justification went only to the kind of forces on which a decision was yet to be made -- that is, ground forces liable to become involved in direct engagements with the Viet Cong.
Here is the cable from Saigon, followed by the two "Eyes only for the President" from the Philippines which sum up his "fundamental conclusions."
FROM SAIGON
WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
STATE EYES ONLY FOR RUSK AND UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON
DEFENSE EYES ONLY SECRETARY MCNAMARA
JCS EYES ONLY GENERAL LEMNITZER
FROM GENERAL TAYLOR *******With regard to the critical question of introducing U.S. military forces into VN:
My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a U.S. military presence in VN capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong or Viet Minh, To relate the introduction of these troops to the needs of flood relief seems to me to offer considerable advantages in VN and abroad. It gives a specific humanitarian task as the prime reason for the coming of our troops and avoids any suggestion that we are taking over responsibility for the security of the country. As the task is a specific one, we can extricate our troops when it is done if we so desire. Alternatively, we can phase them into other activities if we wish to remain longer.
The strength of the force I have in mind on the order of 6–8000 troops. Its initial composition should be worked out here after study of the
